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Summary 
The Space Shuttle orbiter skin panels were ana- 
lyzed under pressure loads simulating hydrodynamic 
loads to determine their capability to sustain a po- 
tential ditching and to determine pressures that 
typically would produce failures. Two DY CAST 
(Dynamic Crash Analysis of Structures) finite ele- 
ment models were used in the study. One model was 
used to represent the skin panels in the center body 
(bays 1 to 11) while a second model was used to ana- 
lyze a fuselage skin panel in the wing region (bay 12) 
of the orbiter. Three types of pressure loads were ap- 
plied to the DYCAST skin models: a uniform pres- 
sure load, a nonuniform pressure distribution rep- 
resentative of that produced by a body planing on 
a water surface, and a nonuniform pressure applied 
over different portions of the panels representative of 
a shifting load that would occur as the orbiter pitched 
over on the water surface. 
Typical uniform pressure loads that produced fail- 
ures (defined as onset of plasticity in the stiffeners or 
skin panels using conservative yield stresses) ranged 
from 7.5 psi to approximately 9 psi depending on the 
skin and/or stiffener thicknesses in selected bays from 
1 to 11. Failure pressure for the wing region (bay 12) 
was found to be about 2.5 psi. 
For the nonuniform pressure loads, typical peak 
pressures of about 25 psi were found to produce ini- 
tial failures for the various bays selected for analysis. 
A peak pressure of 25 psi corresponds to a planing 
velocity of approximately 36 knots. By contrast, typ- 
ical ditching velocity for the Shuttle orbiter would be 
in the 215-knot range, which could produce a peak 
pressure of approximately 900 psi. 
From an assessment of the DYCAST nonlinear 
computer results, it is concluded that the probabil- 
ity is extremely high that most, if not all, of the lower 
skin panels would rupture under ditching conditions. 
Extremely high pressure loads which are produced 
during hydrodynamic planing far exceed the very low 
predicted failure pressures for the skin panels. Con- 
sequently, a ditching of the orbiter is not considered 
to have a high probability of success and should not 
be considered a means of emergency landing unless 
no other option exists. 
Introduction 
After the tragic loss of the Space Shuttle Chal- 
lenger and its crew, the President’s commission rec- 
ommended that various aspects of the operations of 
the Space Shuttle be examined in detail (ref. 1). 
As part of the NASA response to the commis- 
sion’s recommendations, the potential capabilities for 
ditching the Shuttle orbiter were assessed. At the 
request of the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space 
Center, NASA Langley Research Center undertook 
this assessment. Available reports (refs. 2 to 5) on 
aircraft ditching and reference 6, which deals with 
model ditching studies of the Shuttle, were reviewed. 
It was concluded from this review that no definite 
statement about the potential safe ditching of the 
orbiter could be expressed with desired certainty. 
Consequently, additional analyses were proposed to 
provide additional data to assist in determining the 
capability of the Shuttle structure to withstand a 
ditching. As part of the assessment, Johnson Space 
Center conducted simplified analyses of the lower 
skin panels and requested that Langley Research 
Center conduct more detailed, nonlinear finite ele- 
ment analyses of the same regions for an independent 
evaluation. 
This report presents analytical results from the 
nonlinear, finite element program DYCAST 
(Dynamic Crash Analysis of Structures, ref. 7) for 
pressure loadings that were applied to the Shuttle 
orbiter skin panels to simulate hydrodynamic loads. 
Results are presented for center-body and wing re- 
gion skin panels (bays) to determine the pressure- 
carrying potential of the Shuttle orbiter in a ditching 
situation. 
DYCAST Analytical Program 
DYCAST is a nonlinear structural finite element 
computer code developed by Grumman Aerospace 
Corporation with principal support from NASA and 
the FAA. A general discussion of some features of 
the program is included here; however, for complete 
details reference 7 should be obtained. The program 
may be run for static or dynamic loading conditions. 
The element library consists of stringers, beams, 
membrane triangles, plate bending triangles, and 
nonlinear spring elements. 
Material nonlinearities (plasticity) are accommo- 
dated by one of three options: (1) elastic and per- 
fectly plastic, (2) elastic and linear hardening plas- 
tic, or (3) elastic and nonlinear hardening plastic of 
the Ramberg-Osgood type. Option (1) was used in 
the current study. Geometric nonlinearities are han- 
dled in an updated Lagrangian formulation by re- 
forming the structure into its deformed shape after 
small load (or time) increments while accumulating 
deformations, strains, and forces. The failure option 
may be imposed automatically whenever a material 
failure strain criterion is met. 
Point, line, and surface loadings are available. In 
this study, surface loads were gradually applied to 
represent water loading (see refs. 8 and 9). Both 
constant and spatially varying loads were applied to 
the panel models. 
I 
Panel Finite Element Models 
Assumptions 
In conducting the analytical study on the Shuttle 
orbiter (fig. I),  certain assumptions were made to 
limit the size of the analytical modeling effort, the 
cost of computing results, and the time to conduct 
the investigation. The zssumptions included the 
following: 
1. Failure was assumed to have occurred when 
loads produced onset of plasticity in either the 
2024-T351 aluminum skin or stiffeners of the 
Shuttle bottom panels. Allowable compressive 
yield stress a t  room temperature (39 to 45 ksi) 
was reduced to 35 ksi for a 350’F temperature 
condition on the Shuttle skin, and this value was 
also used for tensile yield stress in the analy- 
sis. (See table 3.2.3.0(bl) and fig. 3.2.3.1.2(a) in 
ref. 10.) Under this assumption, the pressures 
that produce plasticity should be conservative. 
2. The impact phase of the ditching was not con- 
sidered. The analysis was conducted assuming 
steady-state conditions of planing on the water. 
3. Three pressure distributions used in the analysis 
are shown pictorially in figure 2: a nonuniform 
pressure distribution over the panel (fig. 2(a)) 
similar to those presented in references 8 and 9 
for planing flat bodies, a uniform pressure dis- 
tribution (fig. 2(b)), and a variation of the non- 
uniform distribution (fig. 2(c)) wherein the loca- 
tion of the leading edge of the distribution was 
moved to distinct locations along the panel to 
represent a traveling wave (to simulate movement 
because of pitch-over of the Shuttle). Figure 2(d) 
shows the approximation made for the pressure 
distribution for input in DYCAST as the loading 
function. 
4. The above pressure distributions were applied in a 
static analysis since the desired distributed pres- 
sure loading was not available in the computer 
program’s dynamic analysis section. 
5. Symmetric conditions were assumed about the 
Shuttle’s longitudinal centerline; thus only one- 
half of the panel had to  be modeled. 
6. Strength of backup and support structure of the 
panels was not considered in the analysis nor were 
tiles accounted for in the assessment. Panels were 
assumed flat (although they are slightly curved) 
and were clamped along the appropriate edges. 
Symmetry boundary conditions were enforced on 
the centerline edge. 
Center-Body Panel Model 
Figure 3 illustrates details of the construction 
of the Shuttle orbiter along with the finite element 
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model (fig. 3(c)) of the fuselage panels. The bottom 
structure of the orbiter center body (figs. 3(a) and 
3(b)) is comprised of 11 bays between frames spaced 
from 50 to 65 in. apart. A 56-in. spacing was used as 
a representative average with the width being typi- 
cally about 100 in. from centerline to the outer edge. 
T-shaped stiffeners (approximately 2.4 in. high with 
a 1.0-in. top flange) run longitudinally on the skin 
at  4-in. lateral spacing. Thickness of the 2024-T351 
aluminum skin and stiffeners varied for different bays 
(see table I). The panel model in figure 3(c) is 
comprised of 728 triangular plate elements and 350 
T-section beams with offsets from the panel which 
represent the stiffeners of the panels. Except for 
the centerline, which had symmetric boundary con- 
ditions, all edges were clamped.. The resulting model 
had 1664 degrees of freedom. The same model was 
used for the various bays (1 to 11) of the center-body 
section of the orbiter with appropriate changes to the 
dimensions of the orbiter’s skin and stringers. 
Wing Region Panel Model 
The finite element model of the fuselage in the 
wing region of the orbiter was similar to that shown 
in figure 3(c). For this region (bay 12) the panels had 
rectangular or blade-type stiffeners oriented in both 
the longitudinal and the lateral direction to form a 
waffle-like pattern (see inset sketch on bottom right 
of fig. 3(c)). Skin thickness and stringer spacings 
varied over the bay. Skin thickness ranged from 
0.09 in. to a maximum of 0.25 in. Longitudinal and 
lateral spacing of the stiffeners was generally 4.0 in. 
by 4.0 in. The resulting finite element model had 672 
triangular plate elements and 576 rectangular section 
offset beam elements with a total of 1534 degrees of 
freedom after imposition of boundary conditions and 
the symmetric boundary along the centerline of the 
section. 
Results And Discussion 
Center-Body Panel Model With Uniform 
Pressure Loads 
Results of the finite element analysis of the 
Shuttle orbiter panels under uniform pressure load- 
ing (simulated hydrodynamic loads) are summarized 
in figures 4 and 5 . Figure 4 shows results for selected 
Shuttle orbiter bays in the center body (bays 1, 3, 5, 
and 6) and wing (bay 12) regions. The bar chart be- 
neath the figure presents the uniform pressure load- 
ing in pounds per square inch (psi) which produced 
failure in the panels for several bays. The DYCAST 
predictions indicate that failure would occur in the 
panel stiffeners of the center-body region at pressures 
between 7.50 psi (bay 3) and 9.00 psi (bay 6). Failure 
pressure for bays 1 and 5 was 8.25 psi. Displacements 
for the panels along the centerline of the Shuttle or- 
biter at time of failure (onset of plasticity) are pre- 
sented in figure 5 for these four bays (1, 3, 5, and 6). 
As may be noted in the figure, at  most only 0.14 in. 
of deflection along the longitudinal centerline of the 
orbiter was associated with failure, which occurred in 
the panel stiffeners near the boundary of the panels. 
Center-Body Panel Model With Nonuniform 
Pressure Loads 
For the nonuniform pressure distribution, five lo- 
cations (shifted leading edge locations) of the pres- 
sure were used on the center-body panels to sim- 
ulate the movement of the pressure as the orbiter 
pitched over. The analytical results for the vari- 
ous shifted positions are shown in figure 6 for bay 1. 
The DYCAST results indicate that for shifts of the 
nonuniform pressure from 0 to 24 in. from the front 
edge of bay 1, failures occurred in the stiffeners along 
the edge of the panel at  a peak pressure of 25 psi. 
Failure produced by pressure on the bay 1 panel at  
32 and 40 in. from the front edge of the bay occurred 
at  somewhat higher peak pressure. Pressure p relates 
to planing velocity V as follows: 
p =  - p v  1 2  
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where p is water density. The 25-psi peak pressure 
corresponds to a planing (horizontal) velocity of only 
36 knots, whereas the landing velocity of the Shuttle 
orbiter in a ditching emergency would more likely 
range from 200 to 220 knots. At such speeds the 
pressure could be over 900 psi. For this reason, 
ditching the Shuttle orbiter is likely to result in 
complete failure of most of the lower skin panel 
structure; thus a ditching is not considered to have a 
high probability of success. Reference 11 presents an 
analytical procedure for predicting the pressures and 
distribution on vehicles during a ditching situation. 
The vertical deflection of the symmetric boundary 
of the panel in figure 6(a) shows that only between 
0.11 to 0.15 in. of panel motion was associated with 
the 25-psi peak nonuniform pressure that produced 
the failure loads. However, as may be noted in the 
figure, much less panel displacement was associated 
with the higher failure pressures of the other shifted 
distributions. Figure 6(b) shows the overall panel 
displacement pattern for the pressure distribution 
shifted 16 in. on the panel. The displacements have 
been magnified 50 times in the figure to show overall 
deflected shape of the panel associated with the 
pressure loading. 
Wing Region Panel Model With Uniform 
Pressure Loads 
Results of the DYCAST model of the bay in the 
wing region of the Shuttle orbiter are also shown in 
figure 4 for the uniform pressure case. Data indicated 
that failure was initiated in the blade stiffeners along 
the edges of the panel in this region (bay 12) at 
a pressure load of about 2.5 psi. Although the 
panel has stiffeners in both the longitudinal and the 
lateral direction, the region is relatively weak under a 
uniform surface load such as hydrodynamic loadings. 
Since the panel failed at  the low 2.5-psi pressure 
loading, no attempt was made to analyze the panel 
under the nonuniform and shifted loadings as was 
done for the center-body bays. 
Effect of Yield Stress on Failure of Panels 
If the panels had been loaded with the pres- 
sure distributions using a room temperature value 
of 42 ksi as the allowable tensile yield stress of 
the aluminum material, the pressures at which on- 
set of plasticity (failure) occurred would be approx- 
imately 21  percent higher than those pressures re- 
ported herein. However, the conclusions which were 
drawn from the conservative approach of this re- 
port concerning the lack of ditching capability of the 
Shuttle would not be altered. 
Conclusions 
The Space Shuttle orbiter skin panels were an- 
alyzed under simulated hydrodynamic loads to de- 
termine their capability to sustain potential ditch- 
ing loads and to determine pressures that typically 
would produce failures. Two DYCAST (Dynamic 
Crash Analysis of Structures) finite element models 
were constructed for the study. One model was used 
to represent skin panels in the center body (bays 1 
to ll), while a second model was used to analyze 
a skin panel in the wing region (bay 12) of the or- 
biter. Three types of pressure loads were applied to 
the DYCAST skin models: a uniform pressure load, 
a nonuniform pressure distribution representative of 
a distribution produced by a body planing on a wa- 
ter surface, and a nonuniform pressure applied over 
different portions of the panels representative of a 
shifting load on the panel that would occur as the 
orbiter pitched over on the water surface. 
Typical uniform pressure loads that produced ini- 
tial failures (defined as onset of plasticity in stiffeners 
or skin panels) ranged from 7.5 psi to approximately 
9 psi depending on the skin or stiffener thicknesses in 
selected bays from 1 to 11. Failure pressure for the 
wing region (bay 12) was found to be about 2.5 psi. 
The room temperature allowable compressive yield 
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stress of aluminum (39 to 45 ksi) was reduced to 
35 ksi at  350'F as a conservative value of both 
tensile and compressive yield stress in the analy- 
ses. The use of the higher room temperature value 
of allowable tensile yield stress would produce ap- 
proximately 21-percent higher failure pressures, but 
conclusions concerning the lack of ditching capability 
of the Shuttle would not be altered. 
For the nonuniform pressure loads, typical peak 
pressures of about 25 psi were found to produce ini- 
tial failures for the various bays selected for analysis. 
A peak pressure of 25 psi corresponds to a planing 
velocity of approximately 36 knots. By contrast, typ- 
ical ditching velocity for the Shuttle orbiter would be 
in the 215-knot range which could produce a peak 
pressure of approximately 900 psi. 
From an assessment of the DYCAST nonlinear 
computer results, it is concluded that the probability 
is extremely high that most, if not all, of the lower 
skin panels would rupture under ditching conditions. 
Extremely high pressure loads that are produced 
during hydrodynamic planing far exceed the very low 
predicted failure pressures for the skin panels;  t h u s  
ditching of the Shuttle orbiter is not considered to 
have a high probability of success and should not be 
considered a means of emergency landing unless no 
other option exists. 
NASA Langley Research Center 
Hampton, VA 23665-5225 
November 7, 1988 
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Table I. Thickness Data on Skin Panels 
(Bays 1 t o  6) 
Bay 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Beam - 
T2 -m 
Skin 7 
TI, in. T2, in. T3, in. 
0.083 0.056 0.177 
.086 .058 .lo7 
.089 .061 .095 
.091 .062 .096 
.096 .065 .094 
.lo5 .072 .094 
$' 
a- 
;" 
5 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS 
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L-81-4376 
Figure 1. Space Shuttle orbiter. 
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(a) Nonuniform distribution. 
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(c) Nonuniform, shifted distribution. 
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(d) Approximation for pressure distribution. 
Figure 2. Pressure distributions applied to Shuttle orbiter skin panels. 
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(b) Inverted view. 
Figure 3. Details of construction of Shuttle orbiter bottom in cargo bays. (Fuselage station 2 is given in inches.) 
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Figure 4. Uniform pressure that produced onset of plasticity (failure) in Shuttle orbiter bottom panels. 
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Figure 5 .  Bottom panel vertical deflections along the longitudinal centerline of Shuttle orbiter at onset of 
plasticity (failure) under uniform pressure loads. 
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Figure 6. Bottom panel vertical deflectmiom of bay 1 at onset of plasticity (failure) under nonuniform pressure 
and shifted nonuniform pressure loads. 
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